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Monetary Policy Rules for Transition Economies:  
An Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we innovatively apply both Taylor rule, where an interest rate is used as a 
policy reaction, and McCallum rule, where monetary base is considered as a policy 
instrument, for the new EU member states in analysing monetary policy reaction functions. 
For the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, the Taylor rule is found to be 
suitable to exchange rate targeting, whereas the McCallum rule may be applicable to inflation 
targeting.  Evidence also reveals that for Hungary and Romania, inflation targeting coexists 
with that of exchange rates taking account of both reactions of interest rates and money.     
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1.      Introduction 
In the recent literature on the control of inflation in macroeconomics, the use of Taylor Rule 
has gained wide attention (see, e.g. Taylor 1993, 1999 and 2007, Sánchez-Fung 2005, 
Woodford 2004 and Ghatak and Sánchez-Fung 2007). Such type of attention is 
understandable in the light of the claims that inflation is the ultimate ‘judge and the jury’ of 
the eventual success of a prudent macroeconomic policy for economic stabilisation and 
growth. In  emerging economies of  new European Union (EU) member countries including  
Romania and Bulgaria which have recently joined the EU, not only the control of inflation, 
but also the stability of exchange rates might have been the components of major factors in 
achieving full integration with the economies of Western Europe. In this context, little 
attention has been paid so far about the efficacy of using the Taylor Rule as a policy variable 
though attention has been paid to the role of inflation targeting in some of the transition 
economies (TE).  There is also one another issue to be noted in the monetary policy analysis 
in TE.  How should the stance of monetary policy measured?  Most observers emphasize 
interest rates, whereas the traditional monetary approach stresses monetary aggregate, for 
example the domestic credit component of the monetary bases was deemed to be the variable 
controlled by policy makers.  The empirical emphasis has been on interest rates, and there is 
an acute negligence of the latter in the literature.      
 In this paper, we aim to examine the monetary policy reaction functions based on the 
hypotheses of Taylor rule, where an interest rate is used as a reaction function, and 
McCallum rule, where monetary aggregate matters as a policy tool
3
 in the conduct of 
stabilising main macroeconomic variables including both inflation and exchange rates for the 
transition economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria 
and Romania during the sample period of around 1994 to 2006.   
                                                             
3  We use the term ‘McCallum rule’ (McCallum 1987 and 1988) in order to contrast with the Taylor rule. 
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In general, theoretical and empirical literature of the monetary policy reaction 
function has been addressed mainly for developed countries.   There is a very limited work 
conducted for developing economies, for example, Frömmel and Schobert (2006) studied a 
variation of Taylor rule by adopting forward looking elements put forward by Clarida et al. 
(1998) for the Central and Eastern European countries over the period of 1994-2003.  See 
also, Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002) for Chile and Shortland and Stasavage (2004) for the 
West Africa economies.  These studies follow those for developed economies with a short-
term interest rate as a policy rule to determine the monetary policy reaction function
4
.  Unlike 
developed countries, in emerging markets the transmission mechanism through the channel of 
interest rates may be sluggish due to underdeveloped financial markets, hence it raises a 
question of relying solely on a similar type of model based on the Taylor’s rule to transition 
economies for the policy analysis.   
 The main motivation of writing this paper is to examine whether the TEs mainly 
followed the Taylor rule or the McCallum-type rule as an instrument of monetary 
stabilisation. To the best of our knowledge, such a comparative analysis has not been 
attempted before.  Although, the recent work for Dominican Republic by Sánchez-Fung 
(2005) developed a hybrid monetary policy reaction based on the McCallum rule with money 
as a monetary policy instrument, Sánchez-Fung did not explore the interest rate policy rule.  
        We have modelled a monetary policy function by carefully checking  any structural shift 
in estimates by the likelihood test and the parameter stability by the Chow forecast test.  Our 
main empirical finding is that, in this broader criterion, monetary aggregate were more likely 
to react to the deviation of inflation to its long-run level, whereas short-term interest rates 
                                                             
4  In the work of Savvides (1998) for West and Central African countries, the fixed exchange rate 
arrangements was explained as a monetary policy behaviour by specifying the variables of foreign reserves and 
domestic credit to the government. 
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were  highly sensitive to the deviation of exchange rates from the potential level, except for 
Hungary and Romania, where  inflation targets were found to coexist with that of exchange 
rates taking account of both reactions of interest rates and money.           
 The plan of this paper is as follows.   Theoretical review is found in Section 2.  Data, 
unit root test and structural test are found in Section 3.  Section 4 is for the empirical 
estimation of the alternative hypotheses, and Section 5 presents dynamic responses by 
utilising the impulse response function.  Section 6 is for the concluding remarks.    
 
2. Theoretical Review 
2.1 Policy rule with the interest rate or monetary aggregate as the instrument  
The main type of monetary policy suggested in the early 1990s to control inflation was the 
Taylor rule, which was originally designed for the USA, but also worked well in G7 
economies. These economies are assumed to have both a fully developed long term bond 
market and a foreign exchange market with a high degree of capital mobility.  The Taylor 
rule (Taylor 1993 and 1999) is generally defined by: 
 r = r
*
 + β(π-π*)+ γ(y-y*)       (1) 
where  r : the actual nominal short term interest rate, r
*
: the equilibrium nominal short term 
interest rate, π: the actual rate of inflation, π* : the equilibrium rate of inflation, y: the actual 
output and y
*
 : the capacity output.  A question that arises is if the Taylor rule is also a 
useful guide for monetary policy in TEs. Note that the Taylor rule does not take direct 
account of shocks, which one would expect to occur more prominently in TEs than in 
developed economies. Still, it may be argued that Taylor rules have many of the same 
advantages in TEs as they have in developed countries. In particular, for TEs that do not 
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always choose a policy of a ‘permanently’ fixed exchange rate (perhaps through a currency 
board or through a common currency, e.g. dollarisation in Bulgaria), a sound monetary policy 
could be based on the trinity of a flexible exchange rate, an inflation target, and a monetary 
policy rule. But it will be necessary to change some of the features of the typical kind of 
policy rule that is recommended for countries with more developed financial markets. 
In the context of our analysis, the Taylor rule describes the change in the instruments 
that would accompany an increase in inflation or in real GDP relative to potential GDP. The 
instrument has been a short term overnight interest rate. But other instruments in a policy rule 
could be the money base, or some other monetary aggregate. Although earlier Taylor (1979) 
uses money supply as the instrument, McCallum (1988) explicitly put forward advantages of 
policy rules with a monetary aggregate as the instrument and the famous Friedman growth 
rate rule also has a monetary aggregate as the instrument. Thus, we consider McCallum rule 
as an alternative to Taylor rule to take these considerations into account.  Put simply, 
McCallum (1988) argues in favour of manipulating the monetary base to control inflation. 
Indeed, McCallum’s (1987 and 1988) monetary base rules can be written as:  
Δht = α – Δvt + δ(yt – yt*)       (2) 
h  is the monetary base, α is a constant term, y is the log of nominal output, yt* is the target 
value and vt   is the velocity of monetary base.  A parameter, δ, indicates the speed at which 
deviations of output reach its target value with the policy instrument (Ghatak and Sanchez-
Fung 2007).  McCallum (1987) found that this would have been suitable in terms of smoother 
GNP path after comparing simulations using this with actual policy reactions.  
The following consideration determines the choice between a policy rule with the 
interest rate as the instrument and a policy rule with the money base (or some other monetary 
aggregate) as the instrument. If there is too much uncertainty in measuring the real interest 
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rate or if there are relatively big shocks to investment or net exports, then a monetary 
aggregate is the preferred instrument. The same is true if it is difficult to measure the 
equilibrium real interest rate. But if velocity shocks are big, then the interest rate is the more 
suited instrument.  The preference for the interest rate instrument in recent works on policy 
rules primarily reflects velocity uncertainty – a major concern in many TEs particularly when 
money demand function is unstable during a period of structural change and transformation 
of the economies. But there are circumstances where real interest rate measurement is 
difficult. Such cases may very well be present in TEs. In a situation of a high growth rate 
and/or a high inflation rate, the real interest rate is hard to measure, and the risk and 
ambiguity premia can be high and variable, e.g. due to the presence of political uncertainty 
(Svensson 2003, Greenspan 2004 and Ghatak and Spanjers 2007)
5
.  Moreover, if the 
government experiences high fiscal deficits, nominal interest rates are often administered in a 
way that governments can borrow cheap from the market, as often found in developing 
economies.  With an interest rate rule, uncertainty about the equilibrium real interest rate can 
translate into policy errors. Policy makers in TEs might want to give greater consideration to 
policy rules with monetary aggregates, even if rules with the interest rate become the 
preferred choice. 
 
2.2 Inflation and exchange rate targetings 
One of the popular application of the Taylor rule is inflation targeting. Having an inflation 
target is essential for good monetary policy making in cases where a country decides on a 
                                                             
5
  It is argued that the nominal interest rate may fail to be the appropriate instrument in such rules.  The 
extent of political and economic risks inherent in transition economies is not measurable, yet these risks may 
lead to a significant and volatile-ambiguity premium in the interest rate over and above the normal risk 
premium.  This makes the real equilibrium interest rate difficult to measure (Ghatak and Spanjers 2007).   
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flexible exchange rate regime. The inflation target places the nominal anchor on domestic 
prices. In this it contrasts with a fixed exchange rate regime, a currency board, or 
dollarization. The increased focus on the inflation target in TEs is a welcome development. 
By the target rate of inflation we mean the value level of inflation that one would like to be 
the one that the actual inflation rate fluctuates around.  The inflation targeting rule is: 
 rt = ρrrt-1 + (1-ρr)β(πt-π
*) + εmt      (3) 
where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter, and εmt denotes a domestic monetary policy 
shock.  Appendix 1 provides an impression of the inflation targets of some countries that 
operate an inflation targeting regime.  The Taylor rule extends the inflation targeting rule by 
adding the deviation of output from its capacity: 
 rt = ρrrt-1 + (1-ρr)β(πt-π
*
) + (1-ρr)γ(yt-y
*) + εmt    (4) 
A central bank may want to implement a general interest rate rule in order to achieve specific 
policy objectives. Such rule may take the adjustment in exchange rates, as a policy variable, 
and this is obtained by adding a reaction to the devaluation of the exchange rate, as exchange 
rate volatility is a cause for worry to many countries. The rule is 
 rt = ρrrt-1 + (1-ρr)β(πt-π
*
) + (1-ρr)γ(yt-y
*
) + (1-ρr)δ(et-e*) + εmt  (5) 
where et denotes the exchange rate and e* is its’ target level.  This reflects the concern of the 
sustainability of the purchasing power of the domestic currency together with price stability 
and output growth.  This is particularly important for emerging markets, as typically central 
banks appears to be mindful of external factors and the foreign exchange value of their 
currency (Calvo and Reinhart 2002).   
The actual short term interest rate as set by the central bank may, however, at times 
deviate from the one indicated by the appropriate policy rule, as some special factors of the 
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policy environment cannot be included in the rule. Liquidity crises in financial markets will 
usually require such discretion. For example, before the 1987 and 2008 when stock market 
fell respectively in the USA, the Fed was increasing the short term interest rate, apparently 
because inflation and the output gap were increasing. But when liquidity became a concern 
after the crash, the Fed lowered the interest rate and thereby provided more liquidity.  The 
size of the interest rate responses in policy rules matter greatly for economic performance. 
Changing the interest rate by more than one for one with inflation is a crucial property of a 
good monetary policy rule. A response that is smaller than one-to-one can result in very poor 
performance
6
.  
Adapting the McCallum’s equation (2), the policy rule with monetary aggregate can 
be specified as the instrument
7
:   
  Δht = ϐ  + δ (yt – y*)+θ (πt – π*) + (et - e*) + εmt     (6) 
where the first term implies the output gap from the target value, the second term, inflation 
gap and the third term, the exchange rate gap. δ, θ and  are the parameters.  It is probable 
that the interest rate channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism on the price 
level is sluggish owing to the underdeveloped capital and money market, therefore it is of less 
importance, whereas money aggregate may be playing a more central role in inflation 
targeting for emerging economies
8
.   
                                                             
6  An example of this is the USA’s response of the interest rate to inflation in the late 1960s and the 
1970s in comparison with the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
7  See also Sanchez-Fung (2005), who used a hybrid McCallum-Taylor  monetary policy reaction 
function for a developing country. 
8  In industrial economies, interest rates provide much of the fundamental and timely information on the 
economy, to which the policy is directed.  On the other hand, in emerging economies where the markets are 
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 Our empirical analysis is based on the Taylor’s equation (5) and the McCallum’s 
equation (6). 
  
3.     Data, unit root tests and structural break tests 
Aggregate monthly data are used for the seven countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.  The sample period starts from 1994m1 to 
2006m12 with 156 observations, except for the Czech Republic starting 1995m12 onward 
(133 observations), for Hungary, 1995m1 onward (144 observations) and Bulgaria, 2000m1 
onward (84 observations) due to data availability.   Data are collected from the International 
Financial Statistics and Datastream.  The details of the data and the descriptive statistics are 
found  in Appendix 2 and 3.  The variables of GDP (gdp), money (m) and exchange rates (ex) 
are in logarithmic from.  Note that the CPI is used for inflation.  Although it includes 
regulated prices in the basket in TEs, it is well understood to public in the emerging 
economies (Amato and Gerlach 2002)
9
.          
 In order to derive a smooth estimate of the long-run trend component of a series, i.e. 
the approximation of the equilibrium variable of y*, π* and e*, the Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
which smooth series by minimising the variance of the series, is utilised.  The integer value 
for the smoothing parameters is chosen to be at 14,400, suggested by Hodrick and Prescott 
(1997) for the monthly data. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
more likely to be fragmented and yet governed, interest rates do not particularly function as a transmission 
mechanism.  In this case, the quantities in money would be used in the formation of inflation targeting policy 
(Moore et al.  2006). 
9  There is no independent measure of CPI, which separates regulated prices from the basket except for 
the Czech Republic (Amato and Gerlach 2002).  
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The stationary property of each variable is examined by the unit root test.  We 
conduct the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests together with the Phillips Perrons (PP) 
test (Phillips 1987).  The PP test is a variant of ADF based on the Z-test.  While the Dickey-
Fuller procedure retains the validity of tests based on white-noise errors in the regression 
model, the PP test involves a non-parametric correction to the test statistic to account for the 
serial correlation in residuals, and produces statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity 
(Banerjee et al. 1993)
10
.  The test results are found in Table 1 with the notations of nominal 
interest rates (r), inflation gap (ginfl=π-π*), GDP gap (ggdp=y-y*), exchange rate gap 
(gex=e-e*) and money (m).  Where variables are found to contain a unit root, the test is 
conducted by differencing the variables.  
Deviations of inflation (ginfl), GDP (ggdp) and exchange rates (gex) appear to follow 
a stationary process in their levels in either test, since the null of unit root is mostly rejected 
at the conventional significance level.  Four cases in the ADF test, i.e. ginfl in Hungary, ggdp 
and gex in Bulgaria and ggdp in Romania are not rejected, though the PP test rejects the null 
of these variables.  Since the PP test generally has higher power, we treat these variables as 
stationary.  In terms of the time series of r and m, the test statistics are largely in favour of 
non-stationary, and their first differences are shown to be stationary
11
.   
 In light of the unit root test results, the series of r and m are specified in first 
differences to avoid spurious regression, whereas ginfl, ggdp and ggex are specified in levels.  
                                                             
10  Although the PP test has poor sample size properties, given a reasonably large sample size in our 
study, it should not be a concern.   
11  The exceptions are m in Slovenia, where the both tests reject the null of unit root in level and that the 
variable appears to be stationary.  In order to pursue uniformity in estimation across these countries, we, 
however, first-difference the m for estimation.   
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Based on the models (5) and (6), the model specifications for empirical estimation are given 
by respectively: 
Δr = α + β0Δrt-1 + β1ginflt  + β2ggdpt  + β3 gext + ut     (7)  
Δm = μ + η0Δrt-1 + η1ginflt  + η2ggdpt  +η3 gext + ut     (8) 
where the model (7) is associated with the Taylor rule and the model (8), with the McCallum 
rule.  
 The Central Eastern European stock markets have gone through phases of domestic 
and international shifts in the process of transition from command to market economy.  In 
order to examine the possibility of exogenous shifts in the model, the significance of specific-
events is tested.  The event dummies are listed in the notes of Table 2.  Each dummy is 
specified one by one based on the models (7) and (8) for the likelihood ratio test with the 
OLS.  The results are presented in Table 2.   
 The period and shift dummies (D1 and D2) of the Asian and Russian crises are found 
to be significant in six cases, suggesting a contagion effect on the monetary policy reaction in 
these transition economies.  The dummies for inflation targeting in the Czech Republic (D3) 
in the interest rate equation and in Poland (D2) in the money equation are significant, which 
is indicative of a policy shift.  The impact of entry to the EU (D9) is only found in Slovenia.  
This is intuitively plausible, since Slovenia is the only new EU member states, who joined 
ERM II
12
.     
 The significant dummies found in the likelihood test are all, initially, specified in the 
model.  However, evaluating each dummy separately introduces the problem of specification 
bias and tends to lead to increased significance for each dummy.  We have, therefore, further 
checked the significance of the dummy in the process of estimation in Section 4. 
                                                             
12  The Maastricht exchange rate criterion implies a participation in the ERM II for new EU countries as a 
prerequisite for joining the single currency.  Slovenia opted for the ERM II in 2004. 
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4. Estimation  
Since there is potentially an endogeneity problem among dependent and independent 
variables in the models, the instrument variable (IV) method is utilised. The instrument 
variables are the lagged once and twice dependent variables and regressors, which are 
orthogonal to the disturbances.   
 The estimation method takes two steps.  First, we run a regression for the models 
using the IVs by specifying the event and policy dummies and monthly dummies.  We only 
retain the event and policy dummies if they are significant at the 5% level by the t-statistics, 
otherwise dummies are deleted from the model.  We then check the plot of residuals to see if 
there is any spike of the series, from which pulse dummies are determined
13
, which improves 
the fitness of the model.  We then re-run the regression with the statistically significant pulse 
dummies.  The estimation results are found in Table 3.       
 Diagnostic tests for serial correlation by the Breusch-Godfrey test are, in general, 
satisfactory.  Heteroskedasticity test by the Breusch-Pagan-Grodrey method indicates that 
some of the residuals tend to reject the null of homoskedasticity.  This is corrected using 
robust estimation with the White’s heteroskedastic consistent t-ratios.  The Ramsey RESET 
test appears to suggest little presence of specification errors, as the statistics are mostly 
insignificant at the 5% level.     
 These transition economies have undergone substantial changes in the estimation 
period, and that we further carried out a series of Chow forecast tests to examine the 
parameter stability by checking slope coefficients for breaks (Bai 1996).  We chose 5 
potential breakpoints (one every two years) making 5 tests in each equation.  The results are 
                                                             
13  We take a dummy 1 where there is a spike in residuals and 0 otherwise. 
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shown in Table 4.  There is evidence of a break in just 8 out of 70 cases at the 5% 
significance level.  Slovenia has shown to be statistically significant in three cases in Δm 
equation, hence we have checked the separate slope coefficients across breaks, see the notes 
for Table 4.  It is found that only those coefficients for the break point of 2000m12 (i.e. the 
forth column, from 1994m1 to 2000m11) considerably deviate from others.   Overall though, 
these diagnostics suggest that the underlying parameter estimates are remarkably robust 
14
.     
 For the Czech Republic and Poland, inflation targeting policy was officially 
implemented in 1998.  Although there is evidence of an intercept shift as found in Table 2, 
the parameters are found to be stable (see Table 4 where the F-tests are insignificant at the 
breakpoint 1998m12 for both countries).  There is the concern of definition of inflation 
targeting regimes in emerging markets (Amato and Gerlach, 2002).  The criteria include a 
public announcement of a numerical target for inflation or a commitment to price stability, 
and they are not particularly helpful in defining the policy framework for emerging 
economies.  Central banks in developing economies have tended to adopt relatively simple 
method initially as a way to signal their commitment to achieving better inflation control.  
Amato and Gerlach (2002) argue that the authorities’ aspiration or ambition in containing 
inflation rather than as a hard target may be best described as the initial inflation targeting for 
the transition economies.  This might explain the absence of structural changes in parameters.  
All in all, these test results are satisfactory for us to draw inference from the estimates.         
 See Table 3a and 3b.  In terms of the predicted signs on the coefficients, positive signs 
are expected for inflation, GDP and exchange rates in the interest rate equation, whereas 
negative signs should be expected for them in the money equation, if policy makers wish to 
                                                             
14  Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005) also found that the time series on nominal exchange rates did not 
display a structural break during the currency crises in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in modelling exchange 
rates with interest rates and money as regressors.  
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contain instability of these key variables.  By looking at the statistically significant 
coefficients at the 5% level, we notice the correctly signed coefficients for all, except for the 
gex in Romania where a significant positive sign is found in the money equation.    
 Overall, an interesting finding is that more significant coefficients are found on the 
inflation deviation in the money equation rather than in the interest rate equation:  the 
coefficients on ginfl are statistically significant at the 5% level in all cases in Δm equation 
except for Bulgaria, whilst three cases in Δr equation.  The evidence reveals that money tends 
to be more responsive to inflation rate gap.  On the other hand, the sensitivity to the exchange 
rate gap appears to be stronger in interest rates, as more coefficients on gex are statistically 
significant in the Δr model.  These results imply that the authorities use interest rate changes 
in order to defend the value of their currencies
15
, whereas control of money plays a crucial 
role to contain inflation.   
In respect of individual countries, this effect is particularly strong for the ‘first wave’ 
new EU member states of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  This can be 
explained, for example with the Czech Republic, where the monetary policy makers relied on 
credit refinancing quotas and other direct measures in targeting monetary growth, whereas 
nominal interest rates were set at high level even in the decline of inflation, mainly serving 
for an exchange rate peg, providing credibility to foreign investors.  This eventually attracted 
large inflows of foreign capital in the 1990s.  In this respect, the argument that change in 
interest rates have an effect on the inflation indirectly through their effect on the money 
supply, may have a limited application to transition economies.  Slovakia’s inflation targeting 
is only implicit with a considerable discretion, whereas Slovenia officially opted for a 
managed floating regime until joining the ERM II, and the exchange rate targeting seems to 
                                                             
15  This is consistent with the study of Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2005) in their monetary approach to 
exchange rates in the Central Eastern European countries.  
16 
 
be apparent in interest rate equations (see also Beblavy 2002 and Frömmel and Schobert 
2006).    
 The size of the significant coefficients on gex in Δr equation (Table 3a) is relatively 
high, though varying considerably amongst countries ranging from around 1 in Slovakia to 
the highest of 6 in Poland, suggesting that 1% increase in the exchange rate deviation leads to 
a rise of from 1% to 6% in interest rates.  In emerging economies, government and firms tend 
to rely on foreign currency denominated debt, hence the exchange rate changes can have a 
significant impact on debtors’ balance sheets or the profitability of banks (Amato and 
Gerlach 2002).  Judging from this, our result implies that the central banks appear to choose a 
relatively stable nominal exchange rate to safeguard the value of currency.  Note that Poland 
abandoned the zloty’s peg in October of 1991, replaced by a crawling peg with a 
preannounced devaluation of 1.8% per month against a basket of currencies
16
.  During the 
1995, the band was widened to ±7% followed by an independent floating system in 2000.  
This may explain the high responsiveness of interest rates against an exchange rate 
movement.     
 For Hungary and Romania, based on the statistical significance at the 5% level, both 
interest rates and money seemed to have played a role in adjusting the inflation rate.  Note 
that Hungary entered the transition period with a high rate of inflation, e.g. 15% in 1987, and 
nearly 30% in 1989 mainly due to a rapid liberalization of the Hungarian economy.  Hungary 
adopted a fixed peg with adjustment bands to account for the inflation differential between 
Hungary and the countries in its basket, i.e. US$ and ECU.  The prime concern in the 
Hungarian economy is visible; high rates of inflation were contained by raising interest rates 
                                                             
16
  The stabilisation of the economy in Poland started with a high rate of inflation and this reduced the 
price competitiveness of Polish exports with the zloty devalued by 16.8% in 1991 (Kutan and Brada 2000). 
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accompanied with the contraction of money supply.  In the case of Bulgaria, unlike the above 
‘first’ new EU countries, Taylor rule appears to be supported in terms of targeting inflation, 
whereas the McCallum rule has been found more appropriate for protecting the exchange 
rates.     
 It is noted that all the coefficients on ggdp are insignificant in the  Δr equation and 
only two coefficients are found to be significant in Δm equation.  It seems that policymakers 
are not too committed on the output fluctuation as an overriding issue in setting interest 
rates
17
.  In the study of Sánchez-Fung (2005) for Dominican Republic, he also finds that the 
central bank targets less of output gap, instead the exchange rate gap between the parallel and 
official is more of a concern.    
 
5.     Impulse Response function (IRF) 
As a robustness test, we further investigate the alternative hypotheses by producing the IRF.  
The IRF captures the dynamic effects of a shock on endogenous variables.  We analyse the 
four variables in the VAR framework in two-fold: one with Δr , ginfl, ggdp and gex, and the 
other with Δm, ginfl, ggdp and gex.  The former implies the Taylor’s rule, whereas the latter, 
the McCallum’s rule.  We focus on the impact of shock derived from inflation gap and 
exchange rate gap on money and interest rates
18
.  A shock originating in inflation (ginfl) and 
                                                             
17  There is general consensus that inflation-targeting monetary authorities are generally not ambitious on 
output fluctuations among developed economies (Svensson 2002).   
18
  The technique of a vector autoregressive and the corresponding impulse response function has been 
often utilised in the study of monetary policy transmission, see recent study for the U.S. by Brissimis and 
Magginas (2006) and Hanson (2006).     
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exchange rates (gex) not only affects their own variables, but it is also transmitted to interest 
rates (Δr) and money (Δm) through the VAR system.   
 Innovations, tu  in the VAR system may be contemporaneously correlated and that 
may have common components.  It is postulated that  tu  is a linear combination of the pure 
innovations, t  .  In the matrix form, 
tt Au                                                                                                                        (9) 
The pure innovations are serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to each other.  The pure 
innovations will have a contemporaneous effect on endogenous variables.  In order to 
interpret the impulses, a transformation (
1A ) is applied to the innovations so that they 
become uncorrelated, such that 
tt uA
1   ~ (0, D)                                                                                                  (10)   
where D is a diagonal covariance matrix.  The inverse of the Cholesky factor of the residual 
covariance matrix is used to orthogonalize the impulses in our study.  The results are 
presented in Figure 1a with the inflation shock and 1b with the exchange rate shock.  The 
order of VAR is based on Schwarz Information Criterion.  Dummy variables are specified in 
line in the model in Table 3 provided they are statistically significant.    
 Each plot shows the dynamic response of Δr and Δm to one standard deviation 
innovations in ginfl and gex over forecast horizons of up to 10 months
19
.  Confidence 
intervals are estimated by using the Monte Carlo integration with 1000 draws.  If the 90% 
confidence interval contains zero, this indicates that the estimated response is statistically no 
different from zero at the 10% level of significance.  Note that the expected response of  Δr  
                                                             
19  10 months are the plausible range as the IRF mostly converge to the long-run equilibrium level within 
that  time horizon. 
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is expected to be positive, whereas that of Δm is negative resulting from a positive shock in 
ginfl and gex, if economic theory holds.          
 Starting with inflation shock in Figure 1a, shock in ginfl initially causes positive 
impacts on interest rates (the first column) in Hungary and Poland at the 10% significance 
level.  A closer inspection of IRF indicates that within approximately 3 to 5 months the 
dynamic effects of the shock will cease, as IRF approaches zero.  A discernable negative 
impact on Δm (the second column) is observed for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
and to a lesser degree for Slovakia where the confidence interval marginally contains zero.  
There is a sign of role of money as a policy instrument for containing inflation fluctuations, 
which is consistent with the estimation result. 
 In terms of exchange rate shock in Figure 1b, this, too, is supportive to the estimation 
results.  Δr in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia positively responded from 
a shock in the exchange rate gap. 
 
6.     Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigated the monetary policy reaction function based on the Taylor’s 
and McCallum’s hypotheses.  We find more of significant coefficients on inflation deviation 
in the money equation than in interest rate equation, whereas the exchange rate deviation is  
found to be significant in the interest rate equation.  This is, in particular, evident in the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  For these countries, the Taylor rule may be 
suitable to exchange rate targeting, whereas the McCallum rule may be applicable to inflation 
targeting in empirical analysis.  Evidence also reveals that for Hungary and Romania, 
inflation targeting coexists with that of exchange rates taking account of both reactions of 
interest rates and money.     
20 
 
 In the literature much attention is given to the hypothesis of Taylor type rule for 
developed economies.  Our empirical results raise the question of relying on this for 
developing economies.  We took a first step for applying both Taylor rule and McCallum rule 
for transition economies in analysing monetary policy reaction functions.  Further 
investigation of the dual hypotheses for other developing countries would be of use to policy 
makers.
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Appendix 1     Inflation targets 
 
Country Inflation target Target’s horizon  
Australia 2% to 3% (since 1993) Medium term 
Brazil 5.1% (for 2005) 1 year 
Canada 1% to 3% (since 1998)  Medium term 
Chile 2% to 4% (since 2001) Medium term 
Colombia 3.5% to 4.5% (for 2007) Medium term 
Czech Republic 2% to 4% (since 2005) 1 year 
Mexico 2% to 4% (since 2004) Medium term 
Norway 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2001) Medium term 
Peru 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2002) Medium term 
Philippines 4% to 5% (for 2006) 1 year 
Poland 1.5% to 3.5% (since 2004) Medium term 
Sweden  1% to 3% (since 1995) Medium term 
United Kingdom 2% (since 2004) Medium term 
Source: various sources 
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Appendix 2     Data        
Monthly data retrieved from IFS with the code and Datastream: 
 
Discount rates 60ZF except for Romania where Repurchase Agreement 60A. ZA is used.  For the Czech Republic, discount rates start from 
1995m12Industrial production 66ZF is used for GDP.  For Bulgaria the data are only available 2000m1 onward. 
Exchange rates RF.ZF. NC/US$ (where NC is national currency). 
Consumer price index, CPI  64ZF.  For Hungary monthly CPI starts 1995m1 onward, which is retrieved from Datastream. 
Real effective exchange rate RECZF  
Money (currency and demand deposits) 34ZF.  For Hungary (currency) and Slovenia (base money), money is retrieved from Datastream. 
 
Note that we also tested two alternative variables for money aggregate:  
i) the assets in the balance sheet of central banks, i.e. foreign assets 31N..ZF and domestic credit 32...ZF (Sánchez-Fung 2005) and  
ii) monetary base, i.e. currency outside banking institutions  14A..ZF and reserves in the banking sector with central banks 20...ZF.   
We did not purse these alternatives due to poor performance.   
 
 
23 
 
References 
 
Amato, J.D. and S. Gerlach. (2002).  Inflation targeting in emerging market and transition    economies: Lessons after a decade, European 
Economic Review, 46, 781-790.  
 
Bai, J. (1996). Estimation of a change point in multiple regression model, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 551-563. 
 
Banerjee, A., J. Dolado, J.W. Galbraith and D.F. Hendry (1993).  Cointegration, Error-Correction and the Econometric Analysis of Non-Stationary Data: 
Advanced Texts in Econometrics, Oxford University Press. 
Beblavy, M. (2002).  Exchange rate and exchange rate regime in Slovakia: Recent developments, International Center for Economic Growth 
European Center Working Paper on Macroeconomi Studies, No. 5, Budapest.  
 
Brissimis, S.N. and N.S.Magginas (2006).  Forward-looking information in VAR models and the price puzzle, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
53, 1225-1234. 
 
Calvo, G.A. and C.M. Reinhart (2002).  Fear of floating, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 379-408. 
 
Clarida, R., J. Gali and M. Gertler (1998).  Monetary policy rules in practice: some international evidence, European Economic review, 42, 
1033-1067.   
 
Crespo-Cuaresma, J., J. Fidrmuc, and R. Macdonald (2005).  The monetary approach to exchange rates in the CEECs, Economics of Transition, 
13(2), 395-416. 
 
Frömmel, M. and F. Schobert (2006).  Monetary policy rules in Central and Eastern Europe, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Discussion Paper 
No. 341. 
 
Ghatak, S. And J.R.Sanchez-Fung (2007), Monetary economics in developing countries, Palgrave, Macmillan. 
 
Ghatak,S and W. Spanjers (2007), Monetary Policy Rules, Transition Economies and The Impact of Ambiguity, International Journal of 
Development Issues, 6(1), 26 – 37. 
24 
 
 
Greenspan, A. (2004). Risk and uncertainty in monetary policy. American Economic Review 94 (2), 33-40. 
 
Hanson, M.S. (2006).  Varying monetary policy regimes: A vector autoregressive investigation. Journal of Economics and Business, 58, 407-
427.   
 
Hodrick, R.J. and E.C. Prescott (1997).  Postwar U.S. business cycles: an empirical investigation’, Journal of Money, Credit  and Banking, 29, 
1-16.  
 
Kutan, Ali, M. and J.C. Brada (2000)  The evolution of monetary policy in transition economies, March/April, 2000, Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, 31-40.   
 
MacKinnon, J.G. (1991).  Critical values for cointegration tests, in R.F. Engle and C.W.J. Granger (eds.), Long-run economic relationships: 
Readings in cointegration, Chapter 13, Oxford University Press. 
  
McCallum, B. T. (1987).  The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: a concrete example, Weltwirtschaftliches Archives, 123(3), 415-
429. 
 
McCallum, B. T. (1988).  Robustness properties of a rule for monetary policy, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 29, 53-
84. 
 
Moore, T., C.J. Green and V. Murinde (2006). Financial Sector Reforms and Stochastic Policy Simulation: a Flow of Funds Model for India, the 
Journal of Policy Modelling, 28(3), 319-333.  
 
Phillips, P.C.B.  (1987).  Time Series Regression with a Unit Root, Econometrica, 55, 277-301. 
 
Sánchez-Fung, José R. (2005).  Estimating a monetary policy reaction function for the Dominican republic, International Economic Journal, 19, 
563-577. 
 
Savvides, A. (1998).  Inflation and monetary policy in selected West and Central African countries, World Development, 26, 809-827. 
 
25 
 
Schmidt-Hebbel, K. and Tapia M. (2002).  Inflation targeting in Chile, North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 13, 125-146. 
 
Shortland, A. And D. Stasavage (2004).  What determines monetary policy in the Franc zone?  Estimating a reaction function for the BCEAO, 
Journal of African Economies, 13(4), 518-535.   
 
Svensson, L.E.O. (2002). Inflation targeting: Should it be modelled as an instrument rule or a targeting rule?  European Economic Review, 46, 
771-780.  
 
Svensson, L. E. O. (2003). What is wrong with Taylor rules? Using judgment in monetary policy through targeting rules. Journal of Economic 
Literature,  41 (2), 426-477. 
 
Taylor, J.B. (1979).  Staggered wage setting in a macro model, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 69, 108-113. 
 
Taylor, J.B. (1993).  Discretion versus policy rules in practice, Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214. 
 
Taylor, J.B. (1999).  Monetary policy rules, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
 
Taylor,J.B. (2007), The Explanatory Power of Monetary Policy Rules ,The Adam Smith Lecture,Annual Meeting of the 
National Association of Business Economics, September 10, 2007, San Francisco 
 
Woodford, M. (2004).  Inflation targeting and optimal monetary policy, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 86, 15-41. 
 
   
 
26 
 
Appendix 3     Descriptive statistics 
 
 Czech Rep. Hungary 
 r ginfl ggdp gex m r ginfl ggdp gex m 
 Mean 6.2887 0.0068 0.0002 -0.0001 6.4474 15.2228 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7.6876 
 Median 5.0000 -0.1305 0.0001 -0.0012 6.2991 12.3750 -0.0857 -0.0012 0.0017 7.7668 
Maximum 18.2000 3.4033 0.0743 0.1097 7.1968 28.0000 4.2177 0.0746 0.1091 8.6713 
 inimum 1.7500 -0.9539 -0.0726 -0.1379 5.9087 6.0000 -0.8952 -0.0533 -0.1110 6.7301 
 Std. Dev. 4.6414 0.6176 0.0271 0.0513 0.4343 7.1899 0.5468 0.0242 0.0398 0.5999 
 kewness 0.8178 2.5482 0.2061 -0.1298 0.2799 0.4386 3.4783 0.4892 -0.0040 -0.1591 
 Kurtosis 2.1900 12.2411 3.5195 2.8162 1.4610 1.7893 25.2846 3.4115 3.1227 1.7161 
 Poland Slovakia 
 r ginfl ggdp gex m r ginfl ggdp gex m 
 Mean 16.1774 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0001 11.4670 7.7881 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 12.2161 
 Median 19.0000 -0.0284 0.0019 0.0038 11.5450 8.8000 -0.2356 0.0024 0.0001 12.0122 
Maximum 31.0000 2.4282 0.0872 0.0978 12.5275 12.0000 4.8835 0.0689 0.0988 13.1787 
Minimum 4.0000 -2.6574 -0.0823 -0.1417 10.1331 3.0000 -1.0328 -0.0657 -0.1016 11.5190 
 Std. Dev. 8.5708 0.6420 0.0309 0.0390 0.6095 2.4934 0.8475 0.0255 0.0421 0.4693 
Skewness -0.1134 0.3994 0.0344 -0.4797 -0.4212 -0.3755 3.4794 0.0820 -0.1054 0.6763 
 Kurtosis 1.5672 6.9225 3.0731 4.2001 2.3782 2.4970 17.9048 3.0336 2.4418 2.1394 
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Appendix 3     Descriptive statistics (continued) 
 
 Slovenia Bulgaria 
 r ginfl ggdp gex m r ginfl ggdp gex m 
 Mean 9.9412 0.0035 -0.0004 0.0002 6.6026 3.1840 0.1932 0.0000 -0.0092 8.9047 
 Median 11.0000 0.0190 -0.0002 0.0017 6.7117 2.9450 0.2495 -0.0057 -0.0071 8.8495 
Maximum 17.0000 1.0362 0.0642 0.0969 7.2262 4.7900 2.9285 0.2005 0.0764 9.6852 
Minimum 4.5000 -1.2690 -0.0811 -0.1185 5.3706 1.8900 -2.4811 -0.1293 -0.1317 8.2368 
 Std. Dev. 3.3202 0.4714 0.0237 0.0515 0.4865 0.9177 1.0720 0.0633 0.0455 0.4010 
Skewness 0.2702 -0.0759 -0.3726 -0.2232 -0.6765 0.3506 -0.1383 0.4596 -0.2757 0.2174 
 Kurtosis 3.1000 2.8414 3.7335 2.3372 2.4368 1.7059 3.6040 3.4016 2.6195 1.8937 
 Romania 
 
 r ginfl ggdp gex m 
 
 Mean 32.1155 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1521 
 
 Median 35.0000 -0.2183 0.0065 0.0034 1.1942 
 
Maximum 70.0000 25.3569 0.1820 0.3543 3.5659 
 
Minimum 7.5000 -4.5789 -0.1651 -0.2106 -1.6145 
 
 Std. Dev. 15.4268 2.8153 0.0595 0.0906 1.3662 
 
Skewness 0.4524 5.5447 0.0296 0.7493 -0.1182 
 
 Kurtosis 3.2809 46.9384 3.2446 5.7242 2.0045 
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Table 1    Unit root test: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perons (PP) tests 
 Level Differenced Level Differenced Level Differenced Level Differenced 
ADF Czech Rep.   Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  
r -0.966 (0) -13.667 (0) -0.487 (0) -10.868 (0) -0.678 (0) -11.550 (0) -1.179 (0) -11.974 (0) 
ginfl -3.757(5)  -2.651 (12) -9.758 (12) -4.327 (12)  -11.089 (0)  
ggdp -4.511 (1)  -3.526 (1)  -3.495 (3)  -4.301 (3)  
gex -4.348 (1)  -4.141 (1)  -5.144 (1)  -4.266 (1)  
m -0.525 (0) -14.082 (0) -1.081 (13) -2.409 (12) -2.126 (1) -17.179 (0)  -0.503 (0) -14.134 (0) 
ADF Slovenia  Bulgaria  Romania   
r -1.527 (0) -12.161 (0) -2.724 (0) -13.012 (0) -2.020 (0) -10.285 (0)  
ginfl -11.11 (0)  -10.477 (0)  -6.544 (0)   
ggdp -6.747 (0)  -1.484 (11) -3.869 (11) -2.636 (12) -3.963 (11)  
gex -4.121 (1)  -2.417 (0) -11.000 (0) -4.774 (3)   
m -3.812 (1) -25.302 (0) -2.801 (1) -8.880 (0) -0.202 (12) -3.901 (11)  
 Level Differenced Level Differenced Level Differenced Level Differenced 
PP Czech Rep.   Hungary  Poland  Slovakia  
r -0.974(6) -13.453 (6) -0.659(6) -11.125 (5) -0.811 (7) -11.902 (7) -1.201 (6) -12.101 (6) 
ginfl -12.820 (21)  -10.856 (5)  -9.571 (4)  -11.579 (11)  
ggdp -7.008 (6)  -6.173 (7)  -10.042 (7)  -7.798 (5)  
gex -3.774 (3)  -3.595 (3)  -4.179 (6)  -3.616 (3)  
m -0.731 (4) -14.1257 (4) -0.087 (8) -17.7826 (6) -2.081 (14) -17.668(2) -0.767 (3) -14.158 (1) 
PP Slovenia  Bulgaria  Romania   
r -1.534 (2) -12.161 (1) -2.786 (5) -13.100 (3) -1.960 (6) -10.569 (5)  
ginfl -11.114 (1)  -10.463 (3)  -6.114 (9)   
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ggdp -6.728 (3)  -7.933 (4)  -7.371(5)   
gex -3.400 (3)  -3.030 (10)  -3.173 (10)   
m -3.228 (1) -25.504(1) -2.492 (6) -9.245 (5) -1.596 (9) -20.618(8)  
Critical values: 3.473 for 1% level, 2.88 for 5% level and 2.577 for 10% level with a sample period from around 1994m1 to 2006m12, except for ggdp in 
Bulgaria, which is 3.511 for 1% level, 2.897 for 5% level and 2.586 for 10% level with a sample period 2000m1 to 2006m12 (MacKinnon 1991).  Lag length 
criterion is based on Shwarz Information Criterion for ADF tests, starting from a maximum lag of 13.  Bertlett Kernel estimation  method is utilised with the 
lag length criterion of Newey-West Bandwidth for the PP tests. 
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Table 2   Structural break tests  
 
 Czech 
Rep. 
Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Romania 
Δr 
equation 
      
D1 1.543 1.219 0.019 1.316 0.120 0.072 
D2 7.028* 0.874 0.185 0.692 0.340 2.182 
D3 14.661*      
D4      1.613 
D5   0.091    
D6  0.965     
D7   0.788    
D8    0.002   
D9 0.078 0.132 2.212 0.971 0.018  
Δm 
equation 
      
D1 5.655* 12.877* 0.062 1.289 0.203 0.648 
D2 0.192 2.710 14.264* 0.020 8.498* 7.977* 
D3 1.572      
D4      9.017* 
D5   10.078*    
D6  1.124     
D7   3.494    
D8    1.313   
D9 0.0009 0.102 0.110 0.030 4.395*  
 
Notes:  
D1 Asia and Russia financial crises, floating regime in Czech Rep.: period dummy 1 
during 1997m5 to 1998m8, 0 otherwise 
D2 Asia and Russia financial crises: shift dummy, 1 for 1997m5 onward, 0 
otherwise 
D3 Inflation targeting in the Czech Rep.: 1 for 1998m1 onward, 0 otherwise 
D4 Massive devaluation followed by undeclared policy change in 1998 with respect 
to exchange rates and high inflation in Romania:  
1 for 1997m1 onward, 0 otherwise 
D5 Inflation targeting in Poland: 1 for 1998m9 onward, 0 otherwise 
D6 Widening bands in managed exchange rate system in Hungary: 1 for 2001m5 
onward, 0 otherwise 
D7 Floating regime in Poland: 1 for 2000m4 onward, 0 otherwise 
D8 Floating regime in Slovakia: 1 for 1998m10 onward, 0 otherwise 
D9 Entry to the EU for Czech Rep. Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia: 1 for 
2004m5 onward, 0 otherwise 
 
Likelihood ratio test chi-squared (df=1) with a critical value of 3.84 at the 5% level.  * 
significant at the 5% level.  Bulgaria is not applicable, since the sample period starts from 
2000m1.  
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Table 3a   Monetary policy reaction model: dependent variable Δr  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Bulgaria Romania 
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
α -0.084 -1.481 -0.122 -0.751 -0.091 -0.446 0.009 0.125 0.035 0.232 -0.119 -0.779 -0.004 -0.008 
Δr (-1) -0.217* -2.380 0.070 0.905 0.014 0.161 0.005 0.056 -0.047 -0.556 -0.325* -3.046 0.092 1.065 
ginfl -0.060 -0.601 0.260* 2.201 -0.010 -0.073 0.034 1.121 0.164 1.491 0.109* 2.792 0.167* 2.430 
ggdp 1.393 0.572 1.341 0.640 0.720 0.312 -0.829 -1.011 1.090 0.548 0.196 0.206 4.670 1.354 
gex 3.025* 2.342 0.979 0.761 6.332* 3.521 1.030* 2.035 2.511* 2.652 -0.112 -0.141 -0.940 -0.485 
dummy   2.828* 3.443           
R
2 
0.101  0.303  0.210  0.110  0.136  0.346  0.189  
Breusch-Godfrey 0.115  2.838  0.534  1.474  2.051  0.039  1.755  
Breusch-Pagan 22.281  18.139  10.336  16.287  28.137  16.652  22.964  
Ramsey RESET  0.962  1.916  0.915  0.079  2.051  0.656  3.617  
 
Table 3b     Monetary policy reaction model: dependent variable Δm  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Bulgaria Romania 
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef.  Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
α 0.009* 3.532 0.063* 8.960 0.035* 4.957 0.016* 2.137 0.035* 3.515 0.137* 5.233 0.188* 12.993 
Δm (-1) -0.183* -2.535 -0.361* -4.456 -0.275* -3.447 -0.100 -1.236 -0.658* -10.011 -0.244 -1.598 -0.314* -3.191 
ginfl -0.017* -2.959 -0.012* -2.479 -0.021* -4.030 -0.014* -3.207 -0.022* -2.047 -0.003 -0.664 -0.005* -3.111 
ggdp -0.044 -0.353 -0.173* -2.049 -0.004 -0.044 -0.135 -1.008 -0.158 -0.829 -0.411* -2.520 0.049 0.700 
gex 0.046 0.775 0.066 1.101 0.011 0.119 -0.029 -0.313 0.155 1.333 -0.414* -2.791 0.107* 2.704 
dummy 0.357* 1.986   -0.018* -3.140   -0.026* -2.600   -0.020* -2.975 
R
2 
0.299  0.679  0.314  0.181  0.481  0.293  0.807  
Breusch-Godfrey 0.566  24.500  0.591  1.543  3.281  0.373  0.067  
Breusch-Pagan 24.149  13.940  20.317  13.629  13.304  11.389  28.114  
Ramsey RESET  1.026  5.217  1.005  0.131  2.579  3.051  2.812  
 
(See notes in the next page.) 
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Notes for Table 3 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
Instrument variable method: IV used are lagged once and twice dependent and independent variables.  Sample period 1994m1 to 2006m12 for 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romaine, 1995m12 to 2006m12 for the Czech Republic, 1995m1 to 2006m12 for Hungary and 2000m1 to 
2006m12 for Bulgaria.  Dummy: a pulse dummy 1995m2 for Hungary in Δi equation, a pulse dummy 2002m1 for the Czech Republic and D2 
for Poland and Slovenia and Romania in Δm equation.  
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test: chi-square (df=2) with a critical value of 5.99 at the 5% level and 9.21 at the 1% level.  Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey hetroskedasticity test: chi-squre (df=16, number of regressors including monthly dummies) with a critical value of 26.3 at the 5% level 
and 32.0 at the 1% level.  Ramsey RESET stability test: F test with a critical value of 3.84 at the 5% level and 6.63 at the 1% level, for Bulgaria 
with a critical value of 4.04 at the 5% level and 7.11 at the 1% level. 
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Table 4     Breakpoint tests: F test [Prob.] 
 
Δr 1996m12** 1998m12 2000m12 2002m12 2004m12 
Czech 14.630 [0.009]* 0.076 [0.999] 0.055[0.999] 0.070[0.999] 0.069[0.999] 
Hungary 0.703[0.853] 0.986[0.536] 1.066[0.399] 1.829[0.007]* 0.408[0.994] 
Poland 0.503[0.981] 0.729[0.894] 0.563[0.991] 0.275[0.999] 0.325[0.999] 
Slovakia 0.593[0.942] 1.065[0.422] 1.890[0.005]* 0.824[0.768] 1.174[0.279] 
Slovenia 0.258[0.999] 0.416[0.999] 0.362[0.999] 0.278[0.999] 0.219[0.999] 
Bulgaria NA NA NA 1.213[0.341] 0.592[0.917] 
Romania 0.717[0.845] 0.177[0.999] 0.202[0.999] 0.243[0.999] 0.365[0.998] 
Δm 1996m12** 1998m12 2000m12 2002m12 2004m12 
Czech 1.227[0.275] 0.900[0.676] 1.398[0.076] 0.262[0.999] 0.405[0.995] 
Hungary 0.637[0.908] 0.475[0.998] 0.730[0.903] 0.940[0.587] 1.204[0.252] 
Poland 0.324[0.999] 0.510[0.996] 0.605[0.981] 0.666[0.939] 0.539[0.962] 
Slovakia 1.564[0.138] 1.085[0.392] 1.561[0.034]* 2.508[0.000]* 0.285[0.999] 
Slovenia 6.207[0.000]* 9.055[0.000]* 5.411[0.000]* 1.450[0.067] 1.459[0.103] 
Bulgaria NA NA NA 0.239[0.999] 0.483[0.972] 
Romania 1.736[0.073] 1.325[0.162] 1.062[0.406] 1.127[0.309] 1.471[0.112] 
 
 
Notes: 
F is the Chow test for parameter stability across the break date.  We used the forecast version 
of the Chow test which requires estimation over one sub-sample only.  We estimated over the 
first sub-sample for all 5 tests.    Significance levels are based on )/(
/)(
11
21
kTRSS
TRSSRSS
F
T
TT


 , 
where TRSS   is the residual sum of squares for the whole sample, 1TRSS  is the residual sum 
of squares for the first 1T  observations.  Prob is the probability of finding a value in excess of 
F. 
*  significant at the 5% level. 
**For Poland, Slovenia and Romania, the breakpoint is 1997m6, due to near singular matrix 
with a presence of d2 in the model. 
Recall that Bulgaria start from 2000 due to data availability.  
 
Separate slope coefficients across these breaks for Slovenia are shown in this table: 
from 
1994m1  to 1997m5 
to 
1998m11 
to 
2000m11 
to 
2002m11 
to 
2004m11 
Whole 
(from table 
3b) 
ginfl -0.015 -0.016 -0.006 -0.024 -0.031 -0.020 
ggdp 0.223 0.202 0.000 -0.166 -0.109 -0.158 
gex 0.155 0.150 0.063 0.116 0.136 0.155 
For example, during the sample period from 1994m1 to 1997m5 the coefficient of ginfl is  
-0.015.
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Figure 1a     Response to Cholesky one SD innovation  in inflation gap (ginfl)  
 
Response of Δr : Czech Republic   
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Response of Δm:  Czech Republic   
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Response of Δr : Hungary 
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Response of Δm: Hungary 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Response of Δr : Poland 
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Response of Δm: Poland 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Response of Δr : Slovakia 
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
Response of Δm: Slovakia 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a   Response to Cholesky one SD innovation  in inflation gap (ginfl)   
(to be continued)   
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Figure 1b     Response to Cholesky one SD innovation  in exchange rate gap (gex)  
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Figure 1b     Response to Cholesky one SD innovation  in exchange rate gap (gex)  
(to be continued) 
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